A stable international monetary system has emerged since the early 1990s. A large number of industrial and a growing number of developing countries now have domestic inflation targets administered by independent and transparent central banks. These countries place few restrictions on capital mobility and allow their exchange rates to float. The domestic focus of monetary policy in these countries does not have any obvious international cost. Inflation targeters have lower exchange rate volatility and less frequent "sudden stops" of capital flows than similar countries that do not target inflation. Inflation targeting countries also do not have current accounts or international reserves that look different from other countries. This system was not planned and does not rely on international coordination. There is no role for a center country, the IMF, or gold. It is durable; in contrast to other monetary regimes, no country has been forced to abandon an inflation-targeting regime. Succinctly, it is the diametric opposite of the post-war system; Bretton Woods, reversed.
Motivation and Introduction
All countries choose their monetary policy. Collectively, the interaction of these policies constitutes the international monetary system. For instance, during the "Bretton Woods" regime after WWII, countries fixed their exchange rates to the American dollar. A fixed exchange rate is a well-defined monetary policy that is still used by a number of countries. In the presence of capital mobility, it subordinates monetary policy to the objective of exchange rate stability at the expense of other domestic interests. Because of this conflict, most fixed exchange rates do not stayed fixed for long. But when countries float their exchange rates, they have to choose another monetary regime; floating is not a coherent monetary policy. Some countries have tried to pursue money growth targets, often without success. Others have hybrid strategies involving multiple or moving targets; some countries do not even have clearly-defined monetary policies.
Fourteen of the thirty OECD countries currently have a monetary policy that explicitly targets inflation. These countries have a combined population exceeding 430 million, and produce over an eighth of global output, so inflation targeting is an important monetary policy.
But even these impressive numbers understate the importance of inflation targeting (hereafter "IT"). Twelve OECD countries are in EMU, which is almost a formal inflation targeter (Wyplosz, 2006) , and may become one soon; another pair (Denmark and the Slovak Republic) are waiting to join EMU. 1 The United States has been an implicit IT country for years (Goodfriend, 2003) , and may become an explicit one soon. There is speculation that Japan may adopt IT when its deflationary days are definitively over. So the entire OECD may soon be using the same monetary strategy.
But inflation targeting is not simply a policy of rich countries. As of June 2006, ten developing countries with 750 million people have also adopted IT. Altogether, countries that formally target inflation currently constitute over a quarter of the global economy. And IT is not only important but likely to grow in significance as the remaining OECD and more developing countries adopt it.
This paper examines the implications of this widespread policy for the international strategy of no direct intervention in the determination of the exchange rate. This means allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate continuously in response to financial and economic changes …" 4 The Norwegian central bank has not intervened since January 1999, the Canadian since September 1998, the Israeli since June 1997, and the British have intervened only once since September 1997. 5 New Zealand has not intervened in the foreign exchange market in over twenty years! 6 There are exceptions of course; the Reserve Bank of Australia intervened in the 1990s, the developing countries sometimes intervene, and a few have even maintained exchange rate targets for a while along with their inflation target. But the trend is clearly towards flexible rates; when countries do intervene, the IT countries now do so in order to hit their inflation targets, not to maintain fixed exchange rates. 7 So the international monetary system seems likely to be increasingly dominated by IT countries with floating exchange rates. Despite the relatively youth of this system, some of its properties have been already studied from a theoretical viewpoint; see e.g., Benigno (2005, 2006) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) . The characteristics of IT countries have been studied empirically, and much is now known about monetary policy under IT; see, e.g., Ball and Sheridan (2003) , Bernanke et al (1999) , IMF (2005) , Levin et al (2004), and Siklos (1999) .
However, the focus of empirical work in IT is almost always on domestic aspects of IT, such as the level, volatility, or persistence of inflation or output. There has been little positive analysis of the international effects of IT. Accordingly, the focus of this paper is empirical and international, rather than normative or domestic.
Inflation Targeting: A Durable Monetary Regime
Inflation targeting has proven to be quite durable. Twenty-three countries adopted inflation targets by the end of 2004 (another four have joined in the eighteen months following). population at least as big as those of the smallest IT country. 13 From the universe of all countries with their own money, I form a set of 42 control group countries. 14 Since Iceland (the smallest IT country) is something of a size outlier, as a sensitivity check I also exclude countries smaller than New Zealand (the second-smallest IT country) but larger than Iceland. 15 The members of the control group are tabulated in Table A2 ; "small" countries (defined as those whose 2000 population lay between Iceland and New Zealand) are marked. 16 In 
where: #regchanges i is the number of regime changes for country i, Observations i is the number of (country*period) observations, Timeinregime is the time spent inside in a regime, and regimes is the total number of regimes.
The average probability of regime change may be uninteresting if a small number of countries dominates the sample. The second measure uses each regime as a spell of time, and is simply the inverse of the probability of change. The third measure corrects the second one for bias by weighting observations by the length of the regime; Gopinath and Rigobon provide more details and an example.
I construct my measures for each country in the control group, and tabulate in Table 1 simple averages computed across countries. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) present two (similar) exchange rate regime classifications; one uses three "buckets" while the other uses five.
I use both, as well as the RR classification. To ensure robustness, I also calculate the statistics after excluding the small countries identified in Table A1 . Thus there are six (= three regime classifications x with/without small countries) different estimates tabulated for each statistic.
The estimates of Table 1 give a strong impression that exchange rate regimes for the control group countries have not lasted long. The exact estimates vary a little depending on whether one uses the LYS or RR classification of exchange rate regimes. The RR scheme shows a lower probability of regime change, and a longer average time between regime switches. Still, the most striking finding is how transient exchange rate regimes are. The probability of a regime changing within a year is over a quarter if ones uses the LYS scheme, so that the average regime lasts three years or less. Using the RR classification increases durability some, as does weighting the average time spent in a regime. But overall, exchange rate regimes seem to be ephemeral phenomena. Nothing much depends on whether one uses the 3-or 5-bucket LYS measure, or whether one includes or excludes small countries.
I supplement the three statistical measures presented in Table 1 with survivorship data in Table 2 . I tabulate the probability of exchange rate regimes surviving for different periods of time, in particular through two, four, six and eight years. To check the sensitivity of my results, I again use all three exchange rate regime classifications, and both include and exclude small countries. Since there are different ways to treat the interaction between countries and exchange rate regimes, I produce three sets of results. In the top panel, I treat countries as having countryspecific characteristics since countries may have different probabilities of having exchange rate regimes survive. Alternatively, one can treat each exchange rate regime as an independent observation, as I do in the middle panel. Finally, one can consider only the regime that a country began the sample with, and determine the probability of that initial regime surviving.
No matter how you chop up the data, the impression one gets from Table 2 echoes that of   Table 1 ; exchange rate regimes tend to be fleeting. The default results of Table 2a indicate that the probability of a regime surviving even eight years is below .3; for the 5-regime LYS scheme, it is below .1. The exact survivorship rates vary somewhat, but essentially all are low even six or eight years out. This implies that the data we have on the duration of existing IT countries is starting to be of meaningful duration. Nine IT regimes have already survived eight years; if inflation targeting was comparable in durability to an exchange rate regime, this would be extremely unlikely. 24 I conclude that IT has already proven to be a durable monetary regime, in stark contrast to exchange rate regimes. 
Bretton Woods, Reversed
A number of IT countries are currently in an apparently durable monetary regime; this is the most striking contrast with previous international monetary systems such as the Bretton Woods system. But there are many others. In fact, there are so many points of comparisons between the features of the Bretton Woods system and the behavior of the inflation targeters that I have collected them together in Table 3 .
Most of the differences are straightforward between the systems are straightforward.
Mundell's celebrated "Incompatible Trinity" states that fixed exchange rates, free capital flows and a domestic focus for monetary policy are desirable goals that are mutually exclusive. Most IT countries have liberalized capital markets and relinquished control over their exchange rates, the exact opposite of the Bretton Woods system. 26 Since the IT countries float, there is typically no important role for public capital flows any more; speculative activity on the foreign exchange markets revolves around floaters, not speculators trying to attack a country's fixed rate. And the increased volume of private capital flows has allowed the system to handle large sustained current account imbalances, which are proportionately larger now than during the Bretton Woods regime.
The current system seems to be delivering different (often better) economic outcomes than the Bretton Woods regime. But it is also interesting to trace the history of the system. The
Bretton Woods system was deliberately planned, the outcome of a long series of negotiations between eminent economists representing the interests of critical countries. "Bretton Woods"
itself is the name of the resort town in New Hampshire where the conference delegates signed the agreements for the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the ITO/GATT in July 1944.
The deliberate design and construction of the Bretton Woods system can be contrasted with the evolution of the current system. Countries that adopt IT do not agree to join an internationally recognized monetary system and do not accept commonly accepted "rules of the game" either implicitly or explicitly. Rather, the system has grown in a more Darwinian style, simply because of its manifest success. International cooperation is simply not a key part of the current international monetary system. This is another difference with the Bretton Woods system which required massive international cooperation to function. 27 Accordingly, many of the key institutions of the Bretton Woods system are now essentially irrelevant. The
International Monetary Fund has evolved into a crisis-manager for developing countries (often those suffering speculative attacks on their fixed exchange rate regimes), and plays no real role in the new system. There is no special role for a center or anchor country like the United States -that is, no "N/N-1 problem." Gold is irrelevant (as is the SDR). Developing countries are participating more quickly and fully in the system than they did under Bretton Woods. use all available data for the control group countries, and the IT regime observations for the IT countries.
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I then regress exchange rate volatility on a binary dummy variable which is one for countries that use IT, and zero otherwise. I use OLS and also include an intercept, time-specific fixed effects, and a set of control variables. That is, I estimate:
where: Vol(eer) it is the volatility of the effective exchange rate for country i over period t, IT it is a dummy variable that is one if i is an inflation targeter over period t and zero otherwise, T t is a period-specific fixed effect, X jit is a set of controls, ε is a well-behaved disturbance term, and α, γ, and δ are nuisance parameters. The regressors that I include as controls are the average values of: 1) the current account (expressed as a percentage of GDP); 2) the natural logarithm of openness (exports plus imports, again as a percentage of GDP); 3) log population; and 4) log PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita. The data for the control variables are all taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. A caveat. Since I ignore how countries choose their monetary regime, I am implicitly ignoring potential simultaneity and selection issues. Since not all countries have adopted it, inflation targeting is clearly not a panacea. 32 But as no IT regimes have yet failed, we cannot seriously address the reasons why they might fail with quantitative tools. More generally, we do not currently have a good understanding of how countries choose their monetary regime in practice. This is a fruitful area for future research.
The default estimates are presented in the top row of the table. All six coefficients are negative, though only one is significantly different from zero (for nominal exchange rate volatility using a single cross-section of volatility calculated over all sixteen years of data). Still, the striking feature is that the coefficients are negative at all. This implies that exchange rate volatility (both real and nominal) is actually lower for IT countries than for the control group, some of whom maintain fixed exchange rate regimes! An additional twelve rows present a variety of robustness checks. The first few change the default specification by successively dropping: 1) the time-specific fixed effects; 2) the four controls; and 3) just the population and current account controls. I also try a specification where the level rather than the log of openness is used. I then handle outliers in two different ways. To summarize: exchange rate volatility for IT countries is typically (though often insignificantly) lower for IT countries than for others. That is, the domestic focus of inflation targeting does not seem to come at the expense of higher exchange rate volatility.
"Sudden Stops" of Capital Inflows
There has been much discussion in the literature recently concerning "sudden stops" of international capital. These dramatic shifts in capital flows are often associated with considerable economic distress, and have thus been examined extensively; Calvo, Izquierdo and
Talvi (2006) provide a recent treatment. Accordingly, I now briefly examine whether IT countries have the same propensity to be affected by sudden stops as non-IT countries. (2006), Frankel and Cavallo (2004) , and Frankel and Wei (2004) . These dates differ in a number of respects, including the countries and periods covered, the method of identifying sudden stops, and so forth. Table 5a presents a tabulation of the 294 observations in my sample that overlap with Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) . Each (country x year) observation can be classified by whether it is a) a sudden stop or not (in which case it is labeled "tranquil"); and b) its monetary regime: control observation (for non-IT countries); IT observation; or a pre-IT observation (for the observations before the country changed to IT). The other definitions of sudden stops are presented in panels 5b-5e.
It is apparent from all five panels that it is rare for an IT country to experience a sudden stop. For instance, Table 5a indicates that the Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) definition delivers only one sudden stop for an IT country out of the 94 possible observations. However, eight of the 72 possible control-group observations are sudden stops. Further, in the 128 observations available before the IT countries switched to inflation targeting, they experienced nine sudden stops. For all five definitions of sudden stops, IT countries were less likely to experience sudden stops than they were either a) before they switched to inflation targeting, or b) compared with the control-group countries with other monetary regimes.
That said, sudden stops are rare events, so that these differences are usually statistically insignificant; only the Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) register at conventional levels. The last panel of Table 5 targeting. IT countries experienced fewer sudden stops than either the period before they adopted IT, or than comparable countries with other monetary regimes, but only two of the ten differences are statistically significant.
Succinctly, countries that switch to inflation targeting experience a drop in the frequency of sudden stops. Sudden stops are also less common in inflation targeters than they are in control group countries. These differences are usually statistically insignificant, which seems unsurprising given the rarity of sudden stops. Still, they support the conjecture that the financial crises that plagued the world in the 1990s may soon be a thing of the past.
Reserves and Current Accounts
There is much interest these days in reserve accumulation and current account imbalances, especially for East Asian economies. Accordingly it is interesting to examine the To smooth out the data, I construct (country-specific) averages over time for the three variables of interest (M2/reserves, reserves in import months, and the current account as a percentage of GDP). I follow the strategy I used for exchange rate volatility, and compute my averages over each four-year periods (1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-2001, and 2002-04) , eight-year periods (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , and the whole sample (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . For each sample, I then tabulate the averages for IT countries, and for the control group countries. These are presented in the top rows of Table 6 ; the three panels correspond to the three variables of interest.
Average values for reserves and current accounts for IT countries are generally close to those for the control group. Reserves look smaller for the IT countries compared with the control group, but only really for the mid-1990s and when normalized by money. Reserves look similar between IT and other countries for other samples, or when normalized by trade. The differences are never statistically significant; simple t-tests cannot reject the hypothesis of equal means at standard confidence levels. Similarly, current account imbalances also look similar across IT and control group countries.
The average values mask considerable dispersion across countries. For instance, even if one restricts attention to the control group during the 1990-93 period, Jordan averaged a current account deficit of 10.5% of GDP, while Singapore maintained a mean current account surplus of 9.7%. Even if the average values are similar across IT and control group countries, other parts of the distribution may be different. To test this hypothesis rigorously, I conduct non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions between the IT and control group countries. The p-values for the hypothesis of equal distributions are tabulated in Table 6 . With the exception noted above (M2/Reserves in the mid-1990s), the hypothesis of equal distribution cannot be rejected at conventional levels.
To summarize, reserves and current account imbalances for inflation targeters look similar to those of the control group. Again, the domestic focus of monetary policy under IT does not have significant consequences for key features of the international monetary landscape.
Conclusion
Countries Sustainability is currently the biggest policy issue in international monetary affairs.
There is much heated discussion over global imbalances and the Chinese-American exchange rate; is there a "revived" Bretton Woods system? In the midst of this debate, we should not lose sight of the resilience and stability of the emerging international monetary system, which can be accurately described as "Bretton Woods, reversed." Note: "Pre-IT Obs." refer to the post-1989 but pre-IT observations for countries that adopted IT within the sample. 
